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1.  Introduction  
Cost estimates project global infrastructure requirements at more than US$50 trillion over 
the next 25 years, with emerging countries including China and India at the forefront of 
infrastructural modernisation which is intended to project their economies into global 
leadership positions (Urban Land Institute/ Ernst & Young, 2010).  The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) series of reports entitled ‘Infrastructure to 
2030’ highlight the growing global need for infrastructure investment and conclude that the 
task will run beyond the capacity of national governments alone and that the private sector 
has an important role to play in funding the development of essential services (Adair et al., 
2011).  
 
The scale of the challenge in financing infrastructure development allied with capital budget 
constraints has meant that the appetite for innovative finance instruments has gained 
considerable momentum. According to Strickland (2013), the need for international finance 
and development is a consequence of the economic crisis, which has resulted in reduced 
inward income of public sector funds. Most OECD countries have reduced public 
expenditure in an attempt to curb public debt, resulting in budget cuts (Merk et al., 2012). 
Consequently there has been a reduction in traditional funding routes for infrastructure and 
regeneration development projects and a clear need to explore alternative routes 
(Strickland, 2013).  
 
Bonds are one possible alternative option for funding infrastructure and their applicability is 
the focus of this paper. Bond financing has the potential to be particularly desirable given 
the current economic climate where global savings rates are high (the ‘global savings glut’ 
described by Bernanke, 2005), access to conventional financing vehicles for sizeable public 
projects is restricted, while demand for development is firmly on the rise. The paper 
therefore investigates whether the effective use of infrastructure bonds would facilitate the 
matching of available savings with demand for infrastructure finance.  
 
The provision of modern infrastructure is often the precursor to successful property 
development.  While traditionally the financing of infrastructure has not been viewed as a 
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main stream real estate issue and has not received much coverage in the literature, this 
would appear to be an omission as the construction of roads, railways and airports and the 
provision of utilities, such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and sewerage are enablers of 
property development schemes and underpin their success. To understand the most 
efficient way for this infrastructure to be financed seems to be an important consideration 
for both the real estate and finance industry across the world. Real estate alternatives are a 
growing field of interest for investors and infrastructure is part of the alternatives sector. 
Traditionally investment in real estate has been in the form of equity, but bond investment 
is worthy of detailed consideration. 
 
In the UK, there has been devolution of financial power from central to local government 
presented as an aspect of the localism agenda with increasing financial responsibility passed 
onto local government. This shift can be viewed as an opportunity for local authorities to 
use innovative financial instruments, such as Tax Incremental Financing (TIF), as they 
become more financially autonomous (Hutchison et al., 2012). The restructuring of financial 
responsibility has driven increased participation of private actors in real estate development 
and “more innovative and entrepreneurial modes of infrastructure provision” (Strickland, 
2013, p.387). However in the UK, Regional Development Agencies previously “tasked with 
shaping innovation policy below national level” were disbanded after the 2010 
Conservative-led coalition government came to power and replaced with Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, which continue to be unfunded with the majority of the RDA functions (inward 
investment, sector leadership, business support, access to finance, innovation) being lead at 
a national level instead of by the LEPs (Crowley, 2011).  
 
The London Development Partnership’s Private Finance Working Group report ‘London’s 
Leverage’, identified that the challenge is not to increase availability of public financing for 
development; rather it is to stimulate private finance (Carter, 2006). According to Carter 
(2006) changes to the investment process in the UK is welcomed and much needed with 
increased flexibility and innovation, both important aspects for attracting private sector 
investment in infrastructure. However industry organisations, such as the British Property 
Federation (2008), suggest that new funding mechanisms in England and Wales such as the 
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Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) are insufficient to finance infrastructure in areas that 
urgently need regeneration. 
 
Against this background of the perceived need to attract alternative funding for 
infrastructure and regeneration development projects, the research presented in this paper 
has two clear aims. First, to consider the merits of using bond finance to fund specific 
infrastructure investment projects, hereafter known as project bonds. Second, to consider 
the pricing of project bonds and the level of risk premium demanded by the market, based 
on evidence from selected countries.  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides 
background on the bond market and institutional investment requirements. Section 3 
explains the methodology adopted in the research while Section 4 details the results of the 
interviews and of the analysis of project bonds in selected countries.  Section 5 offers 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
2. Innovative Finance, Institutional Investment and Project Bonds  
Within Europe there is a momentum for cities to generate new initiatives to help leverage 
private sector finance for infrastructure and real estate development, as well as meet the 
increasing demand for modern communications and services (Siemens, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Berwin Leighton Paisner, 2014). Moreover, from the public 
sector there has been a greater use of financial instruments and mechanisms within the 
European Union budget between 2007 and 2013 (Spence et al., 2012). Innovative finance 
has gained international significance with promotion at both global and European levels 
(Sandor et al., 2009). The World Bank broadly defines innovative finance for real estate 
development as involving non-traditional forms of funding through private mechanisms, 
solidarity mechanisms, public-private partnerships mechanisms and catalytic mechanisms 
(Grishankar, 2009). However, innovative finance for infrastructure development is not to be 
viewed as an alternative to traditional forms of finance, but should been seen as 
complementary. The European Union (EU) defines innovative financing as those measures 
providing financial support to address one or more policy objectives through the use of 
loans, guarantees, equity or quasi-equity investment, or other risk-bearing tools – that can 
be combined with grants and involve risk-sharing with financial institutions to boost 
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investment in large infrastructure projects. (Spence et al., 2012). Bond instruments thus fall 
within the possible mix of funding opportunities. 
 
To place UK institutional bond investment in context, the last 50 years has witnessed a shift 
in the proportion of institutional money in fixed income investments (Adair, 2007). In the 
early 1960s pension funds allocated over 50% of their assets in bonds and this fell steadily 
until 1993 to a low of 10%. Since 1994, the proportion has been on a rising trend, with the 
figure around 40% in 2013 (UBS, 2013) and there appears to be a continuing appetite for 
long dated bonds, both from those unsettled by equity market volatility and those seeking 
to match long term debt to long term cash flow. 
 
There are many examples of bonds having been used to finance major public sector 
development schemes most notably in the UK, the £5.2 billion Channel tunnel rail link 
where the government agreed to guarantee £3.75 billion of debt issued by London and 
Continental Railways (Bayley, 2003). Indeed, the use of bonds in the infrastructure phase of 
development was promoted in an Investment Property Forum (IPF)) sponsored research 
project in 2006 that investigated the necessary conditions for institutional investment in 
regeneration (IPF, 2006, Adair et al., 2007).  
 
The necessary conditions for institutional investment in project bonds and the appropriate 
legal structure need to be understood. First, it is important to recognise that the bond 
market is global and institutional investors are sensitive to legal, political and regulatory 
risks and seek jurisdictions with a robust legal framework and minimum government 
interference in pricing or regulation, to prevent instability in the market and the prospect of 
volatility in capital value. It is argued that investors are reassured by a well-functioning, 
consistent and predictable regulatory framework and a stable sovereign debt market, 
against which project bonds are benchmarked (Brealey et al, 1996).  
 
Second, within this framework, infrastructure bonds require the creation of a legally and 
financially self-contained entity (SPV) against which all contracts are written and the 
distribution of risk and return formally agreed. According to Ehlers et al. (2014) this type of 
debt finance is normally non–recourse with the default risk based on the specific project 
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viability and not on the creditworthiness of the corporation, which would be the case with 
corporate bonds. Once infrastructure projects reach the post construction phase and move 
into the operational phase with stable cashflows, the projects become relatively 
straightforward fixed income securities. Ehlers et al. (2014) found that where default does 
occur, the recovery rate on infrastructure bonds is higher than with defaulted corporate 
debt. In part this may be because infrastructure projects tend to be high profile with the 
potential for government support should difficulty arise and partly because default may 
occur earlier in infrastructure bonds with less chance of the project having depreciated, thus 
aiding recovery.  The legal structure, risk/return balance and sector directly impacts on the 
level of risk premium demanded by the market and this along with default rates will be 
analysed later in Section 4. 
 
Institutional investors are attracted to bonds due to the matching of long-term debt to long-
term cash flows of the project. In considering a bond, investors seek inflation hedging, some 
form of additional income appropriate to the risk profile (which maybe low if government or 
local authority backed), a level of security, long term cash flow, a degree of liquidity and low 
correlation with other asset classes (Hutchison et al., 2011). As the risk premium for project 
bonds is a margin over government issued stock it is important to understand the volatility 
surrounding the sovereign debt market since 2008. In the period post the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), the Gross Redemption Yield (GRY) on UK gilts fell sharply as investors fled to the 
safety of government issued stock. For example, the GRY on two year conventional gilts fell 
from 5.77% to 0.96%, from June 2007 to March 2010, while 10 year gilt yields fell from 
5.46% to 3.9% over the same period - the lowest level for at least 30 years. Over the period 
2007 to 2010, the yields on all maturities of gilts - short, medium and long - fell sharply but 
with different degrees of volatility (Hutchison et. al., 2011). In June 2015 the GRY on two 
year conventional gilts was 0.60%, with the GRY on 10 year gilts at 2.10% - historically low 
levels. 
 
However, in the UK (and in some major countries in Western Europe) the relatively low level 
of current gilt yields poses a dilemma for investors who believe that the current market is 
not ‘normal’.  In May 2015, the Governor of the Bank of England suggested that UK inflation 
is likely to climb above 1% by the end of 2015 (Bank of England, 2015) and there is an 
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expectation that gilt yields are going to rise over the next five years as the economy 
recovers, allowing the Government to taper their QE programme. Such a yield shift will 
result in a fall in capital value on an asset, which is traditionally classified as low risk, forcing 
investors to question their level of exposure to gilts. This scenario presents a window of 
opportunity for discrete, low correlation vehicles, offering a higher level of income return 
for those investors prepared to accept a higher level of risk.  
 
Up to the early 1990s, commercial real estate offered investors a 25 year FRI lease with 5 
yearly upward only rent reviews and was a particularly attractive opportunity for 
institutional investors seeking stable, long term income return. However, if the last 30 years 
has seen a gradual decline in the gilt yield, the same time period has witnessed some 
significant structural changes in the UK commercial market. For example, average lease 
length has fallen, holding periods have reduced and break clauses are now common. The UK 
Lease Events Review (2014) published by the British Property Federation, Strutt & Parker & 
IPD reported that the average lease length of all new leases in 2014 (unweighted) was 6.8 
years, with less than 7% of leases over 10 years in length, compared to 20% 10 years ago. 
Overall around 30% of leases have break clauses. This reduction in lease length has occurred 
over a period when the demand for long term income stream has remained constant and 
investors are looking for alternative investments to replace the 25 year cash flow offered 
previously by the commercial real estate market. Thus at the present time, as result of the 
‘non-normal’ market conditions in the gilt market combined with the changing investment 
characteristics of the commercial real estate market, there is an opportunity to satisfy 
investment demand for long term income products by introducing some form of 
infrastructure or development bond.  
 
Infrastructure or property development debt is viewed as a sub sector of the main debt 
market and is seen as distinct entity in its own right – an uncorrelated asset class with the 
possibility of stable, predictable cashflows. The main risk to the cashflows is a specific risk, 
and relates to the characteristics of the individual project and sector. There are a range of 
options along the risk curve with some projects viewed as low risk, such as government 
regulated utilities with built in RPI (Retail Price Index)/CPI (Consumer Price Index) uplifts, 
through to, for example, the transportation sector, where cashflow could be exposed to 
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traffic sensitivities and onto relatively high risk real estate development in regeneration 
projects (Adair et al, 2007). In that respect investors seeking a decent level of diversification, 
need to know which part of the infrastructure or development market they are involved 
with and require understanding of the specific risk sensitivities and whether or not there are 
any government guarantees. For example, where the infrastructure bond is used to finance 
say, investment in utilities and the returns are government backed and RPI/CPI linked, there 
is security of income flow but no control over consumer pricing. The key downside being 
that the investor would not benefit from any general uplift in capital values as they could in 
a real estate development related project. While project issues affect the cash flow risk, the 
required return is the product of market forces. Changes to market interest rates feed 
directly through to bond pricing.  However, where investors plan to hold until redemption, 
price volatility may not be the key concern. 
 
For those involved in raising finance, the infrastructure or development bond model has 
significant appeal at a time when the tightening of the regulatory regime following Basle III 
and Solvency II has resulted in higher solvency levels and less conventional lending in the 
market (Maxted & Porter, 2014). The issuing vehicle or entity of a bond is very important. 
Whether the bond is government, local authority or corporate backed has a direct impact 
on the pricing and success of the bond issue. A bond issue guaranteed by central or local 
government would provide comfort to the investor and as governments are major winners 
in regeneration developments, it is argued that they have an interest in underwriting the 
risk. Indeed, if the local authority was underwriting the bond, the coupon payments could 
be funded out of a TIF model (Adair et al., 2011). However, it is questionable in the current 
market in the UK, where an austerity regime is in place and public sector cuts are the 
flavour, whether the UK Treasury would be willing to underwrite any further commitments. 
Where a government guarantee is not forthcoming then a bond insurance or wrapper can 
be bought and priced into the investment equation (Adair, 2007). 
 
3. Methodology 
This paper forms part of a wider research project which investigated innovative finance for 
real estate development in pan-European regeneration following the GFC. The financing of 
infrastructure emerged as a recurring theme during the research.  The research used a mix 
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of qualitative and quantitative methods with desk based study and interviews.  Semi-
structured interviews either by telephone or Skype were carried out with experts 
experienced in finance and real estate development. The selection of interviewees took the 
form of a snowball method to enhance the number of potential good quality interviewees 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2007), with respondents asked to recommend further contacts useful 
to the research.  The method of investigation was predicated upon a ‘retroductive’ process 
whereby semi-structured interviews were undertaken and the results of this process fed 
into the analysis and further questioning of other participants in the study (Naoum, 2013; 
Mason, 2002). The interviews, 17 in total, embraced policy makers, local authority staff, 
planners, developers, investors, fund managers and academics. To give the scope of 
interviewee institutional affiliation, interviews were carried out with leading relevant 
organisations. Institutions included RICS UK, RICS Brussels, Composition Capital Partners, 
Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), Consilia Capital, AEDES Dutch Association of 
Social Housing Organisations, CECODHAS Housing Europe, Battersea Power Station 
Development Company Ltd, The Commercial Real Estate Finance Council Europe (CREFC 
Europe), Royal Bank of Canada, Fédération de l'Industrie Européenne de la Construction 
(FIEC), British Property Federation (BPF), European Association for Investors in Non-Listed 
Real Estate Vehicles (INREV), LaSalle Investment Management, European Investment Bank 
(EIB), AMP Capital, Winchester Partners, Leipziger Platz Development Berlin, and 
Malmendier Hellriegel Rechtsanwälte Partnerschaft. All interviewees were at a senior level 
with the majority of input from professional roles as Directors from their respective 
organisations. Bias from a more director oriented ‘elite’ expertise and opinion was 
accepted, as was any snowball research method when further contacts were recommended 
from interviewees as the research iteratively progressed (Bryman, 2012). Despite these 
biases, it was believed that the greater informed professional expertise provided a rich 
qualitative understanding of the cases and subject matter when extracting information 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2007). The survey work was undertaken during 2014.  
 
Infrastructure bond data was obtained from the Bloomberg
1
 database on all project bonds 
issued in European and Asian countries over the period 2003 to 2014 in order to make a 
                                                      
1
 www.bloomberg.com 
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cross-continent comparison.  For the purpose of this analysis, 2003 was chosen as the start 
date, as data are very limited prior to this.  Also, due to the paucity of data on project bond 
issuance in Europe, a cross-continent comparison was not possible and instead the top four 
Asian countries based on the number of project bonds issued over the period 2003 to 2014 
were selected for analysis. The countries chosen were Malaysia, China, Taiwan and India.  
 
In the first instance the following were examined: (i) the size of the bond markets in terms 
of number of bonds issued, (ii) the composition of the markets with respect to various 
industrial sectors (namely communications, consumer discretionary, energy, healthcare, 
industrials and utilities), (iii) the over-time change in coupon rate and maturity across 
different infrastructure sectors in the sample countries.   
 
Secondly, the historical performance of the government issued bond market was examined 
in each of the selected countries over the period of 2003 to 2014. The data were obtained 
from DataStream2. Within this second stage, particular attention was paid to the temporal 
relationship between the given project bonds’ coupon rates and the GRY on government 
issued bonds. To conduct the analysis on a like-for-like basis, project bonds that had a 
lifespan of around 10 years3 were compared with 10-year government debt. Conceptually, 
the difference between the project bond’s coupon and the corresponding redemption yield 
on government issued bonds represents the risk premium demanded by the market when 
the project bond was issued. The higher the risk premium, the higher the perceived risk of 
the project bond over government issued stock. Zero-coupon bonds were excluded from the 
study due to their lack of comparability, since they do not pay coupons. In addition, a 
correlation test was performed to further scrutinise whether there was co-movement/co-
variation between a project bond’s coupon and government issued bonds. 
 
An integral part of this study was an explicit examination of the manner in which 
infrastructure projects were financed by project bonds before and after the GFC: given the 
significant drop in market interest rates and the fact that investors sought the safety of 
                                                      
2
 www.thomsonreuters.com 
3
 Given the limited number of project bonds with exact maturity of 10 years, bonds that have a lifespan 
between 9 to 11 years were also considered.  
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domestic government bonds, the authors surmise that the amount of risk premium that was 
applied to the project coupons should have adjusted correspondingly against the respective 
GRY of government-issued debts. Nonetheless, depending to a large extent on how adverse 
and persistent the impact of the crisis had on the specific country in general and the 
industry in particular, the project bonds might have exhibited different risk profiles 
reflective of the actual business operating environment and the cost of borrowing.   
4. Results 
Interviews 
The consensus from those interviewed was that due to the nature of the schemes any 
infrastructure/development bond would require to have a lifespan of 20 years plus. Indeed 
the shift to long-term institutional capital was seen to have become more commonplace, 
given difficult relationships with banks and restrictions on lending (interviewee 7).   
 
Given the transparent nature of the long-term fixed income market and the clear risk 
characteristics, it was argued that the pricing of such a bond would be relatively 
straightforward comprising gilts plus a risk premium. For example, given a corporate credit 
rating of single A, it was suggested that a risk premium of say 150 to 300 basis points over 
the comparable gilt may be appropriate (interviewee 17). By offering a vehicle attractive to 
private sources of finance, the need for public sector involvement is reduced along with the 
risk to the public purse. Moreover, where blended public-private finance deals are proposed 
as a solution, striking the right balance in the sharing of risk between the public and private 
sectors was perceived to be an ongoing concern (interviewee 3).  
 
While the UK Treasury may be reluctant to underwrite schemes, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) is committed to supporting project bonds through its Project Bond Credit 
Enhancement Initiative that seeks to provide partial credit enhancement to projects in order 
to attract capital market investors (EIB, 2012; EIB, 2014). The EU is encouraging its grant 
funding to be used more efficiently, given that EU block grant funding is unlikely to increase 
in the near future.  Moreover, there is anticipation that the number of projects seeking 
finance is going to increase, especially when it was stated by one interviewee that: 
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‘The number of projects calling for finance is going to increase significantly. So using 
the grants to leverage in additional sources of funding will be important. We’ll 
probably see EU national grants blended with EIB loan products more in the future’ 
(interviewee 1). 
 
The EIB currently provides a subordinated facility to enhance the quality of the senior bonds 
and therefore increase the credit rating. For example, the Greater Gabbard4 bond issuance 
in November 2013, where the EIB’s involvement enabled the bond to be rated A3 by 
Moody’s, a notch higher than would have previously been the case without enhancement. 
Moreover the issue pricing at 125 basis points over gilts on a 19-year facility was seen to be 
very competitive and much cheaper than a bank facility which would likely have been priced 
at 200 to 225 basis points (interviewee 17).  The issue was three times oversubscribed and 
while largely placed with a wide selection of the UK investor community, also attracted 
strong interest from Canadian and Euro investors, thus demonstrating the appetite for this 
type of product. Presently, the EIB Project Bond Initiative is targeted only at transport, 
energy, broadband, and information and communication technology.  
 
It was suggested that a range of different bond structures could be adopted within an 
infrastructure or development scheme. Specific bonds might be by area, project or sector - 
similar to the widening opportunities via the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) bond mechanism 
to include affordable housing (possibly social housing) as well as transport infrastructure in 
the UK, as has been experienced in the United States (Squires and Hutchison, 2014). As most 
regeneration projects are mixed use, a project specific bond might include a number of 
sectors thus providing diversification benefits. Several interviewees underlined the 
emerging demand for higher risk mixed-use bond financing. Arguments raised included: 
 
‘40% of the funds are in offices, 40% in retail and the balance of 20% spread 
between residential large blocks often mixed use and infrastructure investment 
(Interviewee 14)…Increasingly the commercial developers are looking at residential 
or mixed use schemes (Interviewee 5)…Mixed-use projects will affect the financing 
                                                      
4
 The Grater Gabbard Offshore Transmission project is a joint venture between Balfour Beatty and Equitix 
working with AMP Capital Investors and connects the Greater Gabbard Wind Farm to the UK grid.  
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because different aspects of the scheme will have different returns, risk and lease 
profiles. So for an office block in London a developer might want an institutional 
lease for 10 – 15 years if they can get it, but a 5 – 10 year lease for retail because 
what’s right today might not be right in 5 – 10 years’ time, and this will have an 
effect on the financing structure (Interviewee 2)…In some instances the mixed-use 
finance model on a project can involve a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) element, 
infrastructure element, and largely using the security of the residential exchanges to 
fund the overall project’ (Interviewee 16). 
 
A mixed use project bond is clearly higher up the risk curve than say, a ‘utility focused’ 
infrastructure bond, and in such a scenario where a higher return is demanded, it was 
suggested that issuers may wish to consider the prospect of a participating project bond, 
where investors benefit from both an income return and a share in rental value uplift and 
capital value appreciation (interviewee 17). The UBS Participating Real Estate Mortgage 
Fund, which was launched in January 2014, is an example of how this might work (UBS, 
2014). 
 
In such a participating bond, the investors would benefit from rental value appreciation and 
capital value shift, whether this was achieved through specific asset management practice 
and/or general uplift in the overall market. Uplift in value and ‘value capture’ more 
specifically is placed as important to financing via bonding mechanisms, for example it is 
was stated that: 
 
’People tend not to talk about value capture, but it’s going to become a very 
important funding mechanism and a way of securing advances for real estate 
development. It’s a very important mechanism, and is important to make sure there 
is an appreciation of assets and that the public sector gets its share in the uplift 
which is created’ (interviewee 1). 
 
The capital value return can only be realised following a disposal and thus for this model to 
work it requires the fund to have multiple assets and have clear liquidity events. The fund 
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may well need to be of significant size to achieve this and it was proposed by the 
interviewees, that a minimum fund size of £200 million would be appropriate. 
 
The lack of liquidity of infrastructure bonds in the UK was highlighted, but it was advised 
that the majority of investors tended to hold to maturity as a matter of strategy, although 
that may have been a consequence of the illiquid secondary market giving them no option 
(interviewee 17).  
 
It was suggested by several of the respondents that project bonds would have a pan 
European appeal. While in the UK there has been a marked shift from Defined Benefit (DB) 
to Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes this has not been the case in continental 
Europe where there remains a large number of DB schemes.  Inflation linked project bonds 
were highlighted by one interviewee as an attractive option for institutional investors: 
 
‘Inflation linked bonds might be what investors should be looking at. If pension fund 
and insurance companies are providing the debt then as long as they are getting a 
return protected from inflation and perhaps underwritten by government then this 
should be attractive’ (Interviewee 14). 
 
Given that pension finance schemes require asset liability modelling, the project bond 
would help to match the long-term stream of liabilities. For instance, if the bond was a euro 
denominated issue, the liabilities would be currency hedged and if the coupon was RPI 
linked, would provide a perfect fit for their expected outgoings – and hence generate 
different levels of risk premium. 
Level of Risk Premium 
In order to gain insight into the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis on the use of project 
bonds, the period of analysis was divided into two sub-periods: 2003 to 2007 and 2008 to 
2014.   Table 1 below shows the overall average risk premium across all sectors, while Table 
2 provides a breakdown of background characteristics by industrial sector of the project 
bonds issued in the four Asian countries.  
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Country Number of projects
5
 Average Risk Premium 
(Basis points) 
Years 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 
Malaysia 132 113 245 330 149 250 
China 58 433 491 137 190 180 
Taiwan 168 102 270 63 41 53 
India 23 29 52 160 170 165 
Table 1: Overall Average Risk Premium: 2003-2014 
 
In Malaysia, 245 project bonds were issued during the total sample period. The project bond 
market was dominated by the utilities and industrial sector, which together accounted for 
over 90% of the total project bond issuances. The average maturities of the bonds ranged 
from about 3 years for the consumer and energy sectors, to over 11 years for utilities. The 
impact of the financial crisis can be seen in the substantial fall in the average coupon of the 
project bonds post 2007. For example, the utilities sector experienced a sharp decrease in 
average coupon, resulting in a significant drop in average risk premium of individual projects 
from 295 to 149 basis points over government debt. 
 
China, said to be the most active project bond market in Asia, had 491 infrastructure 
projects funded by project bonds during the same period. The popularity of project bonds 
increased significantly post 2007 as indicated by less than 60 projects financed by bonds 
before 2008 and more than 430 thereafter.  Upon closer examination, the industrial sector, 
utilities and energy were the leading market players in adopting project bonds all through 
the sample period. Contrary to the findings for other countries, China experienced a rise in 
both coupon rates and risk premiums after 2007 across all sectors, which is worthy of 
further investigation. For instance, the average coupons for industrials and utilities were 
4.81% and 4.86% before 2007, and then grew to 5.69% and 5.50% respectively thereafter. 
Their corresponding risk premiums increased from around 150 basis points to about 200 
basis points during the same period.  
 
                                                      
5
 Only project bonds with maturity of around 10 years were considered. 
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In the case of Taiwan, the utilities sector had been prevailing in the project bond market 
almost exclusively with over 97% total market share in terms of the number of project 
bonds issued. A significant reduction in the number of projects was observed, from 167 
during the first sub-period to just 95 during the second sub-period. The contraction of the 
project bond market for the utilities sector saw a slight drop in average coupon, from 2.05% 
to 1.72% during the same period. The average risk premium also fell in tandem by a small 
margin from 63 to 42 basis points.  
 
India, by contrast and despite population size and demand for infrastructure development, 
has a relatively small infrastructure bond market. The utilities industry had been the largest 
project bond-issuing sector with 36 issuances during the sample period, followed by the 
industrial sector and energy. Average maturities for the different sectors ranged from 8.5 to 
11.9 years. Unlike the other three sample countries, the average coupon for all sectors in 
India had remained at a fairly stable level of around 9% pre- and post GFC, while the 
average risk premium for all sectors was around 160 basis points.  
 
The historical correlation between the projects’ coupons and the corresponding 
government bond with roughly 10-year maturity over the period of 2000-2014 for the four 
countries was also calculated (See Figure 1 to 4). We found that Malaysia has the highest 
correlation (88.20%), followed by Taiwan (82.32%) and India (74.29%). China’s infrastructure 
bond market seemed to move at a different pace from the government debt market, given 
the relatively low level of correlation between the project coupons and government bonds 
(42.93%). 
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Country Sector Number of Projects Average Maturity Average Coupon Average Risk Premium (Basis Points) 
2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 
Malaysia Utilities 66 94 160 11.31 years 8.37% 5.64% 6.77% 295 149 258 
Energy 0 1 1 3.50 years nil 2.5% 2.5% nil nil nil 
Industrials 59 12 71 8.74 years 5.95% 4.93% 6.15% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
3 6 9 3.23 years 5.57% 4.29% 4.75% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 4 0 4 5.00 years 4.66% nil 4.66% nil nil nil 
Communications 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Overall 132 113 245 10.13 years 7.47% 5.64% 6.52% 330 149 250 
China Utilities 23 121 144 8.78 years 4.86% 5.50% 5.40% 154 202 192 
Energy 14 85 99 7.90 years 4.75% 5.74% 5.60% 113 166 151 
Industrials 19 186 205 8.00 years 4.81% 5.69% 5.61% 151 190 184 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
1 39 40 6.35 years 5.25% 6.80% 6.61% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 1 2 3 5.00 years 1.20% 2.90% 2.33% nil nil nil 
Overall 58 433 491 8.06 years 4.76% 5.74% 5.64% 137 190 180 
Taiwan Utilities 167 95 262 6.63 years 2.05% 1.72% 1.93% 63 42 54 
Energy 0 6 6 7.33 years nil 1.98% 1.98% nil nil nil 
Industrials 1 0 1 5.00 years 0 nil 5.00% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0 1 1 5.00 years nil 5.00% 5.00% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Overall 168 102 270 6.63 years 2.05% 1.74% 1.94% 63 41 53 
India Utilities 16 20 36 9.63 years 8.91% 9.23% 8.93% 103 200 188 
Energy 2 1 3 8.33 years 14.38% 12.00% 13.58% nil nil nil 
Industrials 3 8 11 11.87 years 5.25% 7.52% 7.72% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 2 0 2 8.50 years 9.12% nil 9.12% nil nil nil 
Overall 23 29 52 9.99 years 9.48% 8.87% 8.98% 160 170 165 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of project bonds of the four sample countries: 2003 to 2014
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Default Rates and Government Protection of Project Bonds 
Intuitively, project bonds tend to be more risky than those of corporate issuers primarily 
because of the inherently complex nature of construction and development, hence higher 
default rates are often presumed. However, a cross-country study on default rates of 
various bond products reveals that such preconception is not necessarily true (Moody’s, 
2012).  In the initial phase of new projects, infrastructure bonds issued by private 
corporations do actually have a slightly higher chance to default than that of non-financial 
corporate bonds (See Figure 5). This could be largely due to unforeseeable circumstances 
(such as delay and disruption in construction) and cash flows to the projects being mostly 
negative. Yet, once the projects reach a more financially mature stage (after the fourth year 
on average), defaults will become less likely relative to other bond projects. Indeed, once 
government infrastructure bonds are taken into account, the performance of all 
infrastructure bonds (Total Infrastructure Bonds in Figure 5) is consistently better than that 
of non-financial corporate bonds throughout the bonds’ lifetime.  
 
Another reason for the project bonds’ greater stability over longer time horizons could be 
the potential government support for the investments.  For example in Malaysia, most of 
the local infrastructure bond issuers, and/or their guarantors, are government-linked 
corporations (GLC) over which the state has direct control as the majority shareholder. 
Furthermore, the majority of the GLCs have been strategically placed under the direct 
management of Khazanah Nasional, the sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia. With these 
added features of institutional backing embedded in their project structures, defaults are 
considerably less likely to occur, especially when the projects are deemed politically 
advantageous or sensitive.  
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Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2012) 
 
Conclusion 
The originality of this paper stems from the analysis of the merits of using projects bonds to 
finance infrastructure investment projects, the pricing of such bonds and the level of risk 
premium demanded by the market. It is evident that in most European countries post GFC, 
austerity regimes are in place and national governments alone are not able to finance the 
growing demand for major infrastructure investment. It is argued that to delay investment 
in this sector has the potential of hindering economic recovery. The need for a partnership 
with the private sector in order to raise the necessary level of capital is thus pivotal.  
 
Institutional investors are attracted to bonds due to the matching of long term debt to long 
term cashflows of the project, so there is a natural fit between supply and demand.  The use 
of bond finance to fund major infrastructure projects is not new, but the current market 
conditions in the sovereign debt market, where strong demand has forced down yields, has 
opened up the opportunity to introduce project bonds offering a higher yield to satisfy 
institutional investment demand for long term fixed income products.  This window may 
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Culmulative
Default Rates
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Figure 5: Default Rates of Investment-grade Bonds
Total Infrastructure Bonds
Corporate Infrastructure
Bonds
Government Infrastructure
Bonds
Non-Financial Corporate
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close in the event of interest rate rises, which are expected to start to happen in the UK over 
the next 12 to 18 months.  However, in continental Europe the very low interest rate 
environment is expected to continue for much longer, due to the lack of economic growth 
and low levels of inflation and therefore the specific opportunity to introduce project bonds 
due to the ‘non-normal’ market pricing of government bonds may be open for a longer 
period in Europe. If this opportunity is not to be missed, further research is needed to fully 
explore and understand institutional investor attitudes to investment in project bonds. 
 
Evidence from the interviewees and from the analysis of project bonds from the Asian 
countries (with the exception of Taiwan) would suggest that a risk premium of between 150 
to 300 basis points over the comparable gilt would be appropriate depending on the sector 
and the degree of government involvement in underwriting the issue. In the market of June 
2015 this might suggest a project bond offering a sub 5% yield.  However, in the event of the 
GRY on a UK 10-year gilt mean reverting to say 5%, the coupon demanded on a project bond 
would need to rise to 6.5%/8.00% in order to maintain the margin. For a pure income 
product an 8% coupon would be challenging and would bring into sharp focus the benefits 
of promoting a participating bond or a convertible bond to allow some trimming of the 
margin.   
 
Of course, interest rates may remain low for a longer period of time than is expected, but 
even if rates do rise, project bonds offer the type of long term income product that 
institutional investors require throughout the economic cycles, with the long life of the fund 
a positive advantage enabling matching of long term liabilities.  In this respect the analysis 
underpinning this paper has significance for the delivery of regeneration and infrastructure 
with the introduction of project bonds an important innovation, assisting the financing of 
investment in these key sectors at a time when bank lending is likely to remain fragile.  
  
Page 21 of 24 Journal of Property Investment & Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
22 
 
Acknowledgement 
The authors would like to thank the RICS for their financial support of the project and the 
numerous respondents who gave so freely of their time. Part of the research was supported 
by a grant from the Hong Kong-Scotland Partners in Post-Doctoral Research Scheme 
sponsored by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong and the Scottish Government (S-
HKU701/13). 
 
References 
Adair, A., Berry, J., Hutchison, N. & McGreal, S. (2007). Attracting Institutional Investment 
into Regeneration: Necessary Conditions for Effective Funding, Journal of Property Research, 
24 (3), 221-240.  
Adair, A., Bery, J., Gulati, M., Haran, M., Hutchison, N., Kashyap., McCord., McGreal, S., 
Oyedele, J., Tiwari, P. (2011). The Future of Private Finance Initiative and Public Private 
Partnership. RICS Research, London: Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). 
Bank of England (2015). The Inflation Report May 2015 Available from: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/2015/.pdf  
[Accessed 9
th
 June 2015] 
Bayley, M. (2003). Channel Tunnel Rail Link: Financing and Risk Transfer, Civil Engineering, 
156 (5), 28-35. 
Bernanke, B. (2005). The global saving glut and the U.S. current account deficit, speech 
delivered at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, Richmond, Va., 10
th
  
March 2005. 
Brealey R., Cooper, I. and Habib, M. (1996). Using project finance to fund infrastructure 
investments, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 93(3), 25-39. 
British Property Federation (BPF) and Strutt & Parker (2013). IPD Lease Events Report, IPD. 
[online] Available from: http://www.bpf.org.uk/en/files/bpf_documents/commercial/IPD-
MSCI-LeaseEventsReport-_FINAL.pdf  [Accessed 14th November 2014]   
British Property Federation (BPF) (2008). Tax Increment Financing: A new tool for funding 
regeneration in the UK? [online], Available from: 
Page 22 of 24Journal of Property Investment & Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
23 
 
http://www.bpf.org.uk/en/files/bpf_documents/finance/BPF_TIFS_Paper_Final_A4.pdf 
[Accessed 14th November 2014] 
Brealey R., Cooper, I. and Habib, M. (1996). Using project finance to fund infrastructure 
investments, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 93(3), 25-39. 
Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods, 4th Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Carter, A. (2006). Building an Investment Market for Economic Development, Local 
Economy, 21 (1), 65 – 72. 
Crowley, L. (2011). Streets Ahead: what makes a city innovate? London: The Work 
Foundation – Part of Lancashire University. 
Denzin, N and Lincoln, Y. (2007). Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, 3rd ed., Sage, London. 
Ehlers, T. Packer, F and Remolona, E. (2014). Infrastructure and Corporate Bond Markets in 
Asia, Reserve Bank of Australia, Conference Volume 2014, 67-91. 
European Investment Bank (EIB) (2012). An outline guide to Project Bonds, Credit 
Enhancement and the Project Bond Initiative, Luxembourg: European Investment Bank. 
European Investment Bank (EIB) (2014). The Europe 2020 Project Bond Imitative – 
Innovative infrastructure financing, Available from http://eib.europa.eu/products/project-
bonds/index.htm [Accessed 14th November 2014]. 
Grishankar, N. (2009). Innovating Development Finance: From Financing Sources to Financial 
Solutions [online], The World Bank, Available from: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/CFP_Working_Paper_No1.pdf 
[accessed 14
th
 November 2014]. 
Hutchison, N., Liu, N., Adair, A., Berry, J., Haran, M. and McGreal, S. (2012). Tax Increment 
Financing - An Opportunity for the UK? RICS Research, London: Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors (RICS). 
Hutchison, N., Fraser, P., Adair, A. and Srivatsa, R., (2011). The risk free rate of return in UK 
property pricing, Journal of European Real Estate Research, 4 (3), 165-184. 
Investment Property Forum (IPF) (2006). Institutional Investment in Regeneration: 
Necessary conditions for effective funding, London: Investment Property Forum.  
Page 23 of 24 Journal of Property Investment & Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24 
 
Mason, J. (2002). Qualitative Researching, 2nd ed., Sage, London.  
Maxted, B, & Porter, T. (2014). The UK Commercial Property Lending Report 2014, De 
Montfort University, Leicester. 
Merk, O., Saussier, S., Staropoli, C., Slack, E., Kim, J-H. (2012). Financing Green Urban 
Infrastructure, OECD Regional Development Working Papers 2012/10, OECD Publishing. 
Moody’s Investors Service. (2012). Infrastructure Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2012H1, 
Available from: http://cib.natixis.com/flushdoc.aspx?filename=Infrastructure_Default_and_ 
Recovery_Rates_1983_2012h1_Moodys.pdf [Accessed 30th July 2015]. 
Naoum, S.G. (2013). Dissertation Research and Writing for Construction Students, 3rd ed., 
Routledge, Oxford.  
Sandor, E., Scott, S. and Benn, J. (2009). Innovative Financing to Fund Development: Progress 
and Prospects [online], OECD Publications, Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/44087344.pdf [accessed 14th November 2014]. 
Siemens, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Berwin Leighton Paisner (2014). Good growth for 
cities, PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
Spence, J., Smith, J. and Dardier, P. (2012). Overview of financial instruments used in the EU 
multiannual financial framework period 2007 – 2013 and the Commission’s proposals for 
2014 – 2020: Analytical Study, Brussels: European Parliament, [online] Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies [accessed 14th November 2014]. 
Squires, G. and Hutchison, N.  (2014). The life and death of Tax Increment Financing (TIF) for 
redevelopment: Lessons in affordable housing and implementation, Journal of Property 
Management, Vol. 32, No. 5, 368 – 377. 
Strickland, T. (2013). The financialisation of urban development: Tax Increment Financing in 
Newcastle upon Tyne, Local Economy, 28 (4), 384–398. 
Urban Land Institute, Ernst & Young (2010).  Infrastructure 2010, Urban Land Institute, 
Washington. 
UBS (2014). UBS Participating Real Estate Mortgage Fund, Available from: 
http://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/about_us/news/news.html/en/2014/01/07/201
40107b.html [accessed 9th June 2015]. 
Page 24 of 24Journal of Property Investment & Finance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
